

Race, Critical Race Theory and Whiteness

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While contemporary science confirms that our practices of racial categorization do not correspond to factual biological classifications, racism (and other forms of oppression) continues to play out in schools, educational policy, and educational research in myriad covert (but sometimes still overt) ways. Even after racial segregation has been outlawed (as in the United States' 1954 landmark case *Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas*), savage inequalities (Kozol, 1991) continue to endure in educational systems across the globe. Educational reforms based on ignoring race, on the one hand, and celebrating diversity, on the other, ostensibly implemented to remedy racial inequity in education, are widely criticized not only as ineffective but also as counterproductive in that they perpetuate unjust structures by inoculating the dominant order from any serious challenge. Ladson-Billings and Tate (1995) maintain that educational reforms that attempt to remedy racial inequity get sucked back into the system (p. 62) partly because the conceptual assumptions upon which such reforms are grounded fail to acknowledge that race and racism cannot be adequately assessed without an analysis of power. In order to understand how race functions in the classroom, in schools, and in educational systems and, furthermore, to appreciate what these critics of seemingly well-intended educational initiatives are pointing to, a critical theory lens of race and racism is crucial.

Critical theories of race and racism explore concepts such as race and racism from the framework of systemic oppression and the normalization of whiteness in order to imagine new possibilities in education that challenge rather than reproduce power systems. Critical theories of race and racism are to be distinguished from critical race theory (CRT). The latter is a movement developed by primarily Black, Latino/a, and Asian American legal scholars in the 1990s and advances specific aims. Space limitations preclude an examination of CRT and how it has been applied to education. For some excellent resources, the reader is directed to Ladson-Billings and Tate (1995), Dixon and Rousseau (2006), and Delgado and Stefancic (2001).

The former term, critical theories of race and racism, is more of an umbrella term that includes a broad constellation of scholarship that explores race and racism through the prism of power systems. In what follows, the concepts of race, racism, and whiteness will be addressed from a critical theory of race and racism perspective.

Race as a Social Construction

Although for many years, scientists endeavored to prove that there were innate biological differences related to people of different races, there is much consensus among scholars in such fields as evolutionary biology, anthropology, and other disciplines that biological arguments for racial difference fail to be supported by scientific evidence. Not only is there more genetic variation within than between the so-called races (Lewontin, 1972; also see Appiah (1992) for an excellent review of the scholarship), but also what little differences that have been established between such supposed groups do not reflect the social meanings that are given to racial differences. To be explicit, there is no scientific evidence that one race is superior or inferior to another. The social construction of race also receives support from the fact that the meaning of race is relative to geographical location and historical period. In the United States, the one-drop rule in which having the most minuscule black ancestry designates one as black regardless of physical appearance can result in someone who is defined as black in the United States yet also be regarded as white in other parts of the globe. That race is a fluid and contested notion also gains support with Ignatiev's (1995) historical study that charts the process by which the Irish, raced as nonwhite when they first settled in the United States in the first half of the nineteenth century, became white by embracing racism in the years surrounding the Civil War.

The concept of race is often conflated with the concept of ethnicity. Those who do research from the ethnicity paradigm often understand ethnicity as a purely descriptive concept and ignore how the white ethnic experience often becomes the normative benchmark from which all other ethnic experiences are understood. Charles Gallagher (2003) argues that the ethnicity paradigm functions to support the myth of meritocracy and encourages blaming the victim explanations for social inequality that exonerate whites and allow them to evade any consideration as to how they might be complicit in perpetuating systemic racism. Although race and ethnicity can overlap and while ethnicities often become racialized, race is conceptually a very different type of difference. While ethnicity describes "that aspect of our heritage that provides us with a mother tongue and that shapes our values, our worldview, our family structure, our rituals, the foods we eat" (Dalton, 1995: 107), races are distinctively constructed to exist only in relation to one another. Whiteness is devoid of

meaning without nonwhiteness constituting its boundaries. Blurring the distinctions between the concepts of race and ethnicity obscures how race is a “fault line along which power, prestige, and respect are distributed” (Dalton, 1995: 108). Educators who use race and ethnicity interchangeably, “confuse the positive role of culture . . . with the negative impact of racism” (Derman-Sparks and Phillips, 1997: 13).

The observation that race does not point to a fixed biological or genetic reality but rather is a socially and historically constructed concept whose meaning shifts through time to serve dominant group interests is now widely accepted in most areas of the social sciences (Lopez, 2000; McCarthy *et al.*, 1993). The aforementioned one-drop rule served to ensure that the offspring of a black slave and a white slave owner would be a slave, not free. The rule justified the raping of black slave women by white slave owners who could perceive this act of violence as a profit-making enterprise because it increased the population of black slaves (Payne, 1998). Omi and Winant (1997) explain that groups become racialized when racial meaning is extended to a “previously unclassified relationship, social practice or group” (p. 64). They coined the term racial formation to describe the reciprocal, sociohistorical process “by which social, economic, and political forces determine the content and importance of racial categories, and by which they are in turn shaped by racial meanings” (p. 61). In the United States, racial systems functioned to justify the institution of slavery.

Once these meanings are constructed, social institutions such as law, media, and education continually reify them and mask their origins. In 1977, Susie Guillory Phipps who identified as white but was designated as black on her birth certificate because her great-great-great-grandmother was a black slave in the South (Omi and Winant, 1994) sued to have her ascription as black changed to white. Yet the courts insisted she was black even though a 100% white racial purity has always been a fantasy. The law is one institution that helps to ensure that the racial system is maintained (Lopez, 2000). Education grounded as it is in the myth of meritocracy is another institution that contributes to the reproduction of a racial system in which those who benefit from the racial system as well as those constrained by it come to see it as real. Omi and Winant maintain that there is a racial etiquette in which racial ways of understanding the social world become common sense and “everyone learns some combination, some version, of the rules of racial classification . . . often without obvious teaching or conscious inculcation” (p. 62).

An essential component of understanding race as a social construction, then, is the acknowledgment of the political and ideological institutions, such as education, that maintain the system that makes race matter. Race might not be real, yet a system of privilege and oppression has been built up around the concept of race with real

material, social, economic, and psychological consequences for groups of people. Furthermore, to say that race is socially constructed is to notice that social groups, not individuals, must be the level of analysis through which race and racism are best understood. It is social groups that come into being through racialization. Peter McLaren (2000) articulates this construction thusly,

People do not discriminate against groups because they are different; rather, *the act of discrimination itself* constructs categories of difference that hierarchically locate people as ‘superior’ or ‘inferior’ and then universalizes and naturalizes these differences. (p. 148, italics added)

It is not that groups do not exist prior to language but rather that the meanings we attribute to social groups depend on discourse. Sally Haslanger (1995) refers to the discursive construction in which social groups come to have certain meanings through language. To say that race is socially constructed, however, does not merely refer to the discursive origins that constitute the meanings of social groups but also that race marks social differences that involve the relative location of groups within a system of social relations in which one group is considered the norm and other groups are evaluated by that norm (Minow, 1990).

In her discussion of the dilemma of difference (i.e., “... when does treating people differently emphasize their differences and stigmatize or hinder them on that basis? And when does treating people the same become insensitive to their difference and likely to stigmatize or hinder them on that basis?” (Minow, 1990: 20), Martha Minow analyzes the normative assumptions that constitute difference and draws attention to social structure as the source of the problem rather than the individual. Minow discusses five assumptions that remain unstated but work in powerful ways to define difference. One of these assumptions is that the norm from which difference is demarcated can be taken for granted and does not need to be made explicit. According to Minow, as long as the norm is not made explicit, how and when difference is stigmatized will not be acknowledged.

Individual people are constituted as raced based on their ascribed membership in social groups but also internalize race as identity and their lives are affected accordingly. The white norm that remains unstated in racist systems will be subsequently addressed. If race is a social construction, one must ask, as Omowale Akintunde (1999: 4) urges educational reformers to ask, “why are we still operating in such a system and to whose benefit?”

Definitions of Racism

Race as a social construction presumes that there is a system of privilege and oppression through which racial

social groups are constructed and that individuals experience oppression not as individuals but as members of an oppressed group. Yet, many people view racism strictly as a matter of prejudice and animus. To view racism solely as prejudice and/or discrimination based on race is to ignore the racist system and how white people have systemically benefiting from the system. According to Akintunde (1999), when racism is understood as something that one consciously chooses and enacts then racism can be practiced by anyone. “That is ‘non-Whites’, too, may engage in practicing racism and thus Whites themselves may be victims of racism.” (Akintunde, 1999: 2) Akintunde contends that by narrowly restricting racism to overt, intentional acts or conscious beliefs, those who benefit from the system not only ensure “that the system of White supremacy remains intact but can, in fact, successfully create smoke screens that actually implicate ‘others’ in the maintenance of such a system” (p. 2).

Similarly, in his discussion of antidiscrimination law, Alan David Freeman (1996) explains that racial discrimination can be understood from the victim’s perspective or from the perpetrator’s perspective. While the latter focuses on intent and finding who did what to whom, the former emphasizes the actual consequences including the objective conditions of life of being a member of a marginalized group. Understanding racism from the perpetrator’s perspective alone results in a strong reliance on fault and intention and, thus, serves to draw attention away from the pattern of conditions that a victim perceives to be associated with discrimination. The upshot is that if one is not the direct cause of a racist act, then one is not at fault and bears no personal responsibility for the act.

In her analysis of the concept of oppression, Marilyn Frye (1992) offers a useful metaphor to highlight these patterns of conditions and to distinguish oppression from personal suffering that anyone can experience. Frye suggests that we imagine a birdcage. The experience of oppressed people, Frye maintains, “is that the living of one’s life is confined and shaped by forces and barriers which are not accidental or occasional and hence avoidable, but are systematically related to each other in such a way as to catch one between and among them and restrict or penalize motion in any direction” (p. 4). These objective conditions are like living in a birdcage. If one were to examine the wires of the birdcage one at a time, one might not comprehend how that one wire is restrictive. It would seem that the bird could just fly around the isolated barrier to freedom. Yet, when one steps back and is able to apprehend the entire cage that surrounds the bird, “it is perfectly obvious that the bird is surrounded by a network of systematically related barriers, no one of which would be the least hindrance to its flight, but which, by their relations to each other, are as confining as the solid walls of a dungeon” (p. 5). Oppression, therefore, involves a pattern of barriers that restrict the movement of those

inside the cage. Moreover, individuals are oppressed not because they are individuals but by virtue of their membership in oppressed social groups.

As a system, racism can be understood to work on three mutually supporting levels: individual, cultural, and institutional. The individual level refers to personal attitudes and behaviors that reproduce racial power differentials. Blatant illustrations are racial epithets and jokes directed at people of color and racial discrimination in hiring practices. Personal racism, however, can work in more covert and subtle ways as will be subsequently described in the section on white privilege. Cultural racism refers to the beliefs, symbols, and ideas represented in the media, pop culture, books, standards of beauty, etc. that construct whiteness as normal, neutral, and superior while simultaneously conveying a negative message about all those who are not ascribed whiteness. It is not just a matter of inclusion of negative stereotypes because exclusion stigmatize, as well. Cultural racism and personal racism mutually reinforce each other.

Finally, institutional racism involves the network of structures and policies that sustain these structures in ways that benefit some groups and disadvantage others. The justice system, the education system, employment, housing, banks, government, and healthcare are only some examples of institutions through which racism is maintained and constantly reproduced (Schmidt, 2005). Individuals who participate in these institutions are complicit in the perpetuation of the *status quo* often without their conscious intent or volition.

If racism is a form of oppression that is systematic and involves interlocking barriers that constrain and limit the life outcomes of members of certain social groups, can the victims of racial oppression be racist? Beverly Daniel Tatum (1997) explains that while any person can have racial prejudices and engage in discriminatory actions, she rejects the use of the term racist to describe victims of racism in order to underscore the continuing power disparities between groups and how the system of oppression sustains white supremacy and systemically benefits all white people. Tatum emphasizes, “People of color are not racist because they do not systematically benefit from racism. And equally important there is not systemic, cultural and institutional support or sanction for the racial bigotry of people of color” (p. 10). Individuals, however, belong to many social groups and thus it is possible to be both oppressed and an oppressor. In order to determine when oppression is taking place, Marilyn Frye (1983) suggests looking at the barrier and asking “Who constructs and maintains it? Whose interests are served by its existence? Is it part of a structure which tends to confine, reduce and immobilize some group? Is the individual a member of the confined group?” (p. 14).

Acknowledging racism as a form of systemic oppression that limits individuals qua members of marginalized

groups is to recognize that there is also a group who benefits from the birdcage being in place. Before addressing the issue of whiteness and white privilege, some complex questions about identity must be raised.

Identity Politics, Recognition, and Essentialist Notions of Race

Multicultural education, so prominent in Western educational systems, rests upon the categorization of individuals into groups, specifically focusing on the groups that have been excluded from mainstream society. In this sense, multicultural education and identity politics have many of the same presumptions. In the latter part of the twentieth century in the United States, political movements arose around the acknowledgment that the experience of injustice was systemic and was connected to one's being identified with an oppressed group. Identity became an important tool in political discourse as the phrase identity politics indicates. Common or shared experience was the unifying force that propelled such movements. There is also the assumption that some type of authentic experience connected to group identity has been suppressed but deserves recognition and respect (Taylor, 1994) and must be reclaimed. What made identity politics so significant, Sonia Kruks (2001) explains, is that it involves a demand for recognition "on the basis of the very groups on which recognition has previously been denied: it is *qua* women, *qua* blacks, *qua* lesbians that groups demand recognition" (p. 85).

Although scientific essentialism has been discredited, from the phenomenon of identity politics it is easy to see how essentialism can arise even when race is understood to be a social construction. Essentialism involves the assumption that there is a uniquely distinguishing feature or features that all in the group share. Often, there is an assumption of a commonality of experience that constitutes and unites the group (e.g., the black experience, and the Chicano experience) that can be described independent of aspects of the particular person's life (Harris, 1990; Crenshaw, 1991). While identity politics was useful in empowering marginalized groups, at the same time the approach attracts much criticism.

Identity politics is accused of assuming essentialist notions of identity. The problems of such essentialism involve the normative consequences of commonality (Spelman, 1988). Who gets excluded any time a 'we' is constructed for the purposes of consensus and unity? In the women's movement, what it means to be a woman has been defined on the basis upon the experiences of white, middle-class, able-bodied, heterosexual women resulting in the exclusion and silencing of women of color as well as lesbian and queer women. In his 1994 film,

Black Is . . . Black Ain't, Marlon Riggs powerfully expressed how black women and black gays and lesbians have been excluded from heterosexist and patriarchal conceptions of African-American identity. In his discussion, Chicano nationalist movement, Jose-Antonio Orosco (2002) highlights how Chicano identity has been defined from a male, heterosexist point of view. He demonstrates how a focus on authentic identity does so at the expense of silencing voices that might contest the gendered and heteronormative conception of Chicano identity. In addition, the appeal to commonality of experience can operate as a disciplinary norm within a group that imposes a particular vision of identity onto members of that group. Essentialism assumes that the lives of people who experience multiple forms of oppression can be reduced to an additive model:

straight black women's experience = the experience of racism
+ the experience of sexism;

black lesbian's experience = the experience of racism
+ the experience of sexism + the experience of homophobia

Yet, for instance, the experience of women of color can be erased because they stand at the intersections of different categories. In many cases when black women face discrimination, their experience is not taken seriously because neither white women nor black men experience discrimination in this way.

Perhaps the most radical extension of the critique of identity politics and essentialism has evolved from post-structuralists such as Judith Butler (1990) and Wendy Brown (1995). Both have charged identity politics with assuming a prediscursive self over which forms of socialization impose nonessential characteristics. According to Butler, however, the subject is always already a product of discourse. Any reclamation of one side of binary categories, even a reclaiming of marginal identities, is to reify the framework from within which those categories are constituted. Wendy Brown, for example, contends that identity politics is based on a reclamation of wounded attachments that sustains victimhood continuing to carry marks of subordination instead of challenging the system from which these attachments originate and which they support. Moreover, such politics place subjects in fixed and stable categories that constrain their freedom. Instead of appealing to any type of identity category, both Butler and Brown recommend that all subject positions be decentered and given identity categories be subverted in ways that destabilize the normalizing discursive forces that create those identities.

One of the problems with the post-structuralist position is the question of agency. How is politics possible without identity categories? In addition, reclamations of racial identity can be political and serve as a way to expose

the systematicity of oppression (Taylor, 2000; Alcoff, 2005; West, 1996). According to Paula Moya (2002), some identities have epistemic status and political salience and can be politically progressive “not because they are ‘transgressive’ or ‘indeterminate’ but because they provide us with a critical perspective from which we can disclose the complicated workings of ideology and oppression” (p. 17). What is of particular interest about Moya’s account is that she acknowledges that the simple fact of being born a person of color in the United States does not in itself give one such epistemic privilege. What this claim underscores is that some people have experiences that other people who are not oppressed do not have. In fact, the systemically privileged have other experiences that protect them from even acknowledging the birdcage. When experiences of oppression are politicized, however, they have the possibility to provide information about how power systems operate and are maintained. Political identities, according to Moya, should not be jettisoned but reclaimed.

Whether or not racial identity categories should be reclaimed or eliminated has been an ongoing debate whose complex details are beyond the scope of this overview. It is clear that these debates raise crucial questions about all educational reforms that are based on social group categories. On the one hand, while multicultural education has been vigorously critiqued (Nieto, 1995), the debates around identity categories highlight the need to be vigilant about reifying categories that sustain frameworks of power and privilege rather than challenge them. However, on the other hand, there are dangers in also abandoning racial discourse. To further flesh this out, whiteness and white privilege must be addressed.

Whiteness, White Privilege, and Critical Whiteness Studies

While for generations scholars of color have argued that whiteness lies at the center of the problem of racism and that whiteness is a mutually constitutive aspect of the social construction of race, it is only relatively recent that whiteness within academe has been acknowledged to be a necessary corrective to the study of race that has been exclusively focused on the racialized other. Critical whiteness studies is focused on exposing whiteness as a taken-for-granted norm from which difference is constructed and seeks to analyze whiteness as a determinant of social power. Whiteness is intimately related to the construction of race in that its own meaning is dependent on the process of negation of what is outside its borders. The center and periphery are mutually constituent. As Frankenberg (1996) puts it, “Whiteness comes to self-name . . . simply through a triumphant ‘I am not that’” (p. 7). Quoting from Hazel Carby, Dyer (2000) argues that it is important to study whiteness, to “make visible what is rendered invisible

when viewed as the normative state of existence” (Carby as cited in Dyer, p. 3) in order to dislodge whiteness from its position of dominance. It is impossible then to gain an understanding of systemic racism without understanding how whiteness works and Dyer claims that whiteness, because it is presumed neutral and normal, can only be studied by making it strange (p. 10).

While the definition of whiteness is difficult to pin down, there is widespread agreement that whiteness is a socially constructed category that is normalized within a system of privilege so that it is taken for granted by those who benefit from it (Rodriguez, 1998; Winant, 1997; Roediger, 1991). Cheryl Harris (1993) suggests that whiteness is best understood as a form of property rights that is systemically protected by institutions such as law. Toni Morrison (1993) uses the metaphor of a fishbowl containing fish and water to elucidate the invisibility of whiteness as the condition from which meaning is made. If we focus on the water and the fish, we do not have to see how the fishbowl itself frames where and what happens within it.

... it is as if I had been looking at a fishbowl – the glide and flash of the golden scales . . . and then I saw the bowl, the structure that transparently (and invisibly) permits the ordered life it contains to exist in the larger world. (Morrison, 1993: 17)

White people’s investment in whiteness can obscure how white people even with the best of intentions are complicit in sustaining a racially unjust system.

Much of the study of whiteness focuses on exposing white privilege. White privilege, as McIntosh (1997) writes, is “an invisible package of unearned assets which I can count on cashing in each day, but about which I was ‘meant’ to remain oblivious. White privilege is like an invisible weightless knapsack of special provisions, assurances, tools, maps, guides, codebooks, passports, visas, clothes, . . .” (p. 291). Acknowledging white privilege challenges the ideology of meritocracy grounding many institutions of education in that it is privilege not only merit that results in white people getting ahead in life. The invisibility of white privilege works in conjunction with the persistent belief in meritocracy, that is, anyone can succeed with hard work and adherence to the rules of society, to constitute those who are Othered by ignoring the fact that systems based on white norms privilege white people. Disparities between the experiences of white people and people of color can be perceived as natural and normal, in other words, the fault of the individual and not the result of systematic privileging of the dominant. The marginalization of people of color, therefore, is held in place by white privilege.

White privilege must be understood as relational and also systemic (Leonardo, 2004).

The ideology of colorblindness (that a race-neutral stance is a remedy for eradicating racism) also plays into

the logic of white privilege – if one does not have to consider one's race, one does not have to consider how white norms operate. Policies and practices based on ignoring race that purport to eradicate racism actually sustain it (Lewis, 2001; Schofield, 1997). One of the privileges of whiteness is the ability to be able to ignore in the sense of remaining ignorant, denying, and dismissing the reality experienced by people of color on a daily basis. In schools, the ideology of ignoring color results in teachers and administrators disregarding the relationship between race and tracking, biased testing, discipline etc ... and protects white people from examining how white privilege hides behind normalized whiteness. Ignoring race gives its advocates the sense that they are adhering to the moral demand for egalitarianism yet in actuality this approach leaves white racial privilege and racial disparities intact and secure. White privilege is systemic in that it is connected with a network of privileges both material and psychological. It is also manifest as a way of being in the world. Marilyn Frye (1992) discusses how being whitely exhibits itself in how white people relate to others, their sense of self and their own morality.

White teachers, for example, need to study whiteness and white privilege so that they can understand how to challenge racism as it is evidenced in their classroom. (For an excellent illustration of how white dominance codes nonwhite students as behavior problems see Delpit, 1995.) But the different discursive disguises that white privilege takes on complicate this. Alice McIntyre (1997) describes white talk as “talk that serves to insulate white people from examining their/our individual and collective role(s) in the perpetuation of racism” (p. 45) Examples of white talk that McIntyre describes are “derailing the conversation, evading questions, dismissing counterarguments, withdrawing from the discussion, remaining silent, interrupting speakers and topics, and colluding with each other in creating a ‘culture of niceness’ that made it very difficult to ‘read the white world’” (p. 46). Hytten and Warren (2003) examine how whiteness gets reinscribed in classroom discursive dynamics. In both studies, the white students were trying to be good anti-racist whites yet unintentionally employed discourse that protects whiteness as the privileged center. Whiteness, therefore, can be subtly reinscribed even when it does not appear to be doing so and can be reified even when “we try to disrupt its normative influence” (Hytten and Warren, p. 65). Such white discursive moves complicate calls for dialog and are necessary to explain why separation rather than integration is often preferred by students of color (see Jones, 1999) and expose the need for a politics of listening alongside the study of whiteness and white privilege.

Critical whiteness studies have attracted much criticism. There is a serious concern with recentring whiteness, white people and white feelings and drawing attention away from the needs and interests of people of color.

In his foreward to the book, *White Reign: Deploying Whiteness in America* Michael Apple (1998) cautions,

Having Whites focus on whiteness can have contradictory effects, one of which we need to be well aware. It can enable people to acknowledge differential power and the race nature of everyone. . . . It can just as easily run the risk of lapsing into the possessive individualism that is so powerful in this society. That is, such a process can serve the chilling function of simply saying ‘but enough about you, let me tell you about me’. (p. xi)

If focused on white self-transformation, whiteness studies can result in white people being concerned about salvaging their good moral being. Dyer notes about white people, “the display of our guilt is our cavalry” (p. 11). Whiteness studies can itself become an exercise in white privilege. If critical whiteness studies are focused on white self-transformation then it fails to challenge whiteness as a norm and instead recenters whiteness, white people, and their feelings, and well-being.

An additional concern involves how categories of race are static in much of the whiteness research (Keating, 1995). On the one hand, if interrogations of whiteness require static concepts of identity, the very framework of us/them that from which racial systems are constructed are reified. On the other hand, without marking whiteness how can it be interrogated? Two approaches to the disruption of whiteness have been discussed. One approach advocates that whiteness be rearticulated while the other contends that whiteness be abolished (Giroux, 1997; Ignatiev and Garvey, 1996). A detailed analysis of both these positions is beyond the scope of this overview. The interested reader is directed to Moon and Flores (2000), Flores and Moon (2000), Warren (2001), and MacMullan (2005).

Much of the discussion in this overview has been dominated by a US focus that may or may not be usefully employed in other national contexts. What lessons can be gleaned will depend on how similar and how different race and racism plays out in other contexts. Already there is a growing body of scholarship that is responsive to the racial dynamics in the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. In all these contexts, whiteness is always the invisible norm from which the other is constructed. Continued research that interrogates race and racism in education is required. While progressive initiatives in education around racial inequity are important, paying attention to the limitations of such projects is also key in making new and better possibilities imaginable.

See also: *Black in White: Black Students at White and Black Colleges*; *Equity and Educational Effectiveness*; *Race and Ethnicity in the Field of Adult Education*; *The History of Education: Race and Education*.

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